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Slip Failure of Embankment on Soft Marine Clay
K. Y. Yong
Lecturer in Civil Engineering, National University of Singapore, Singapore

S. T. Ting
Managing Director, Soil Investigation (Pte) Ltd, Singapore

SYNOPSIS
The results of an investigation carried out at a site before and after the slip failure
of an embankment on soft marine clay are presented.
An evaluation of the possible causes for the
slip failure and the remedial measures taken after the failure are also included.
It appears that
overstressing of the ground might have led to the movement of the soft soil.
The compressible
soils were subjected to an increase in stress without a comparable increase in foundation shear
strength.
This increase in horizontal stress resulted in the horizontal displacement of the soil
as evident by the presence of the tension cracks in the fill just before slip failure occurred.

INTRODUCTION

indicated that the failure encompassed a length
of about 100 m along the canal and extended
across the drainage reserve to about 15 m into
the construction site. Numerous tension cracks
opened up in the fill soil on the site and
drainage
reserve.
A pipeline, which runs
parallel to the canal and supported by pad
footings
at
about
10
m
intervals,
moved
laterally by as much as a metre towards the
canal at some locations before bursting at one
point.
It appears that overstressing of the
ground due to the construction activities and
placement of fill led to the movement of the
soft soil.

July
29,
1982,
during
the
peak
of
On
construction
activities
on
a
site,
its
embankment slipped into the adjacent canal
causing part of the canal walls to collapse.
The construction site, separated from the canal
by a 30 m wide drainage reserve, is for a
proposed development of a vehicle depot with
offices and workshops as shown in Fig. 1.
All
the buildings at the site are supported by
piled foundations and are in various stages of
construction when failure of the embankment
occurred. Placement and compaction of fill for
the vehicle parking area were also actively
in progress at that time.
Site observations

To prevent further movement of the slip and
additional damage to the canal, the slope in
the drainage reserve was regraded and about
1.0 m of fill adjacent to the drainage reserve
was
removed
by
the
site
contractor.
Construction activities also ceased in the
vicinity of the drainage reserve boundary.

EXPRESSwAY

~
~
~--u

SUBSOIL CONDITIONS
::;::
m
--1
;p

Based on earlier site investigation, a typical
section of the soil profile at the site is
shown
in
Fig.
2.
The
subsoil
consists
generally of a top layer of fill deposits of
medium stiff silty clay.
Below this top layer
is soft marine clay overlying medium dense to
very dense clayey sand.
Ground water-table
observed from the boreholes was about 1.5 m to
2. 5 m below the existing ground level at the
site.
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Fig. 1.

From the soil information, it appears that the
vehicle depot development is founded on soft
.ground where the thickness of soft clay is
typically about 10 m.
The shear strength of
this layer is so low that large settlement and
low stability can be expected.

Scale: 1:2000

Site Plan of Proposed Vehicle Depot
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Typical Soil Profile
101. DO

SLIP FAILURE OF EMBANKMENT
The plan and typical sections of the site at
various stages of events, before construction
of the car park format ion to the removal of
collapsed earth and regrading of slope, are
illustrated in sequence in Fig. 3.
Ground
levels for various stages were measured by
surveying techniques.

embankment slipped

AL

To construct the parking area for vehicles,
additional placement of fill was required for
the whole site.
It can be seen from Fig. 3(a)
and (b) that an additional layer of fill of
about 0.3 to 0.5 m was placed at the site.
In
addition, fill of about 2.85 m high was placed
at the boundary of the site and drainage
reserve, extending about 2 m from the toe of
the original slope.
Unfortunately, there was
no available records to indicate the actual
quantity and the rate of placement of fill
except the fact that the fill placement and
compaction began about two weeks prior to the
day of failure.

eaval
f canal
bank
profile after sl i~

101.o9-L!9~·~2.....~~

~ye-witnesses
at
the
site
indicated
that
tension cracks were observed on the fill on the
norning of the day in which failure occurred.
-!.aments after this observation, the pipeline
burst resulting in water overflowing into the
fill
at the
drainage
reserve.
This was
followed subsequently by the slip failure and
upheaval of the banks of the canal as shown in
Fig. 3(c).
Failure encompassed a length of
about 100 m along the canal and extended across
the drainage reserve to about 15 m into the
construction site.
The eye-witnesses further
noted that failure took place suddenly with
out any perceptible vibration.
At the end
of failure,
settlement of the fill at the

42

regraded slop
5 42
101.oo ••~o;.62 }_~2. •

Fig. 3.
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Sequence in Slip Failure of Embankment

boundary had reached over a metre, while the
floor of the canal heaved close to a metre.
The bin centre and vehicle washing shed, which
are supported by tanalised timber piles showed
no structural damage apart from some minor
cracks in the floor slabs.
The rest of the
buildings,
whic~
are supported on precast
concrete piles, appeared to be unaffected by
the slip failure.

(iii) Soil parameters used in the stability
analysis are based on minimum strength
condition.
It can be seen from the results that the
critical slip failure passes through the soft
clay stratum giving factors of safety ranging
from 0.91 to 1.21.
This circle is in good
agreement with the exterior signs of failure.

To prevent further movement of the slip and
additional damage to the canal, construction
activities ceased in the vicinity of the
drainage reserve boundary and the collapsed
soil was removed by the site contractor.
The
removal of the collapsed soil and the regrading
of the slope shown in Fig. 3(d) was completed
in five days.
Although no records were
available on the amount of earth removed, the
site contractor estimated that about 480-lorry
loads were involved.

Method of
Analysis
Method of slices
Method of slices
Navfac DM-7 (1971)

Shear St2ength
(kN/m )

Factor of
Safety

8 (Undrained
Triaxial)
10 (Vane Shear
Test)
8 (Undrained
Triaxial)

0.91
1.21
1.02

Before Fa i 1ure

STABILITY ANALYSIS
Five
days
after
failure,
six
additional
boreholes were carried out in the slipped
area.
The diameter of the boring was 15 0 mm
and casings were used to prevent the collapsed
of the soft clay and loose sand formation.
In
addition, vane shear tests were also conducted.
Results of the field and laboratory
tests were consistent with the findings given
in earlier soil reports.

------------~~--~~------------~14.0
---------------+------------------------~20.0

Critical Slip Failure
Scale:

In establishing the reasons for the failure,
factual evidence rules out a deep seated circular slip. The existence of a zone of very soft
soil directly below the fill suggest a preferential plane of failure in this layer.
Embankments on soft clay induce zones of overstressing. Elsewhere along the potential failure surface, stress levels can be sufficiently
high that creep strains become
important.
Natural
sedimented
clays
possess
critical
strain levels at which clay structure breaks
down.
This breakdown in clay generates the
excess porewater pressure and a progressive
undrained failure can occur rapidly (Bjerrum,
1972).

Fig. 4.

The fill surcharge is applied rapidly on
the clay stratum where no provision is
made to drain porewater during stress
changes.

(ii)

The vane shear strength is corrected for
anisotropic conditions and strain rate
(Bjerrum, 1972).

In examining the possible causes of failure, it
is worth noting that it is difficult to
reconstruct the actual sequence of events that
led to failure; thus factors which initiated
the
instability
seldom
can be positively
identified.
However, based on field observations and information provided by the site
contractor and engineer, the events leading to
failure can be postulated.
During the initial placement of about 5 m of
fill on the marine clay, 12 months before the
present contractor moved in, no sub-surface
drainage was installed to dissipate the excess
porewa ter pressure generated.
Furthermore, no
piezometers were
installed to monitor the
change in porewater pressure in the 10 m thick
marine clay.
The high water-table in the fill
observed at the site may indicate the presence
of excess porewater pressure.
Therefore, when
the site was possessed by the present contra·ctor, there was no information to indicate the
effective stress condition of the subsoil. The
construction activities at the site and the
placement of
the additional fill at
the
boundary of the drainage reserve might have
triggered the failure in view of the marginal
factor of safety for slope stability.
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Results of Slope Stability Analyses

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF FAILURE

Stability analysis have been carried out considering critical circles using total stress
analysis.
The approach to stability analyses
are by the method of slices and the design
charts given in Navfac DM-7 (1982) • Results of
the analyses are summarised in Fig. 4.
The
standard slip circle analysis, using undrained
shear strength calculated from results of
triaxial test and vane tests, is adequate for
the prevailing site
conditions.
In
the
analyses, the following conditions and assumptions were made:
( i)

1:750

as shown in Fig. 3(d) and excess soil
removed to relieve some of the stresses or
soft marine clay.
Inclinometers were r•
mended to be installed at the drainage re:
to monitor any ground movements during :
regrading and the subsequent repair of
canal.

Therefore, it appears that overstressing of the
ground might have led to the movement of the
soil. The compressible soils were subjected to
an increase in stress without a comparable
increase in foundation shear strength.
The
increase in horizontal stress would result in
horizontal displacement of the soil.
This was
evident in the tension cracks in the fill
before slip failure occurred.
In fact, the
tension cracks were a warning sign of impending
instability.

CONCLUSIONS
The lateral movement of the ground resulted in
the pipeline bursting at one of the joints.
Although the control valves of the pipeline was
turned off 20 minutes after the bursting, the
water from the pipeline had overflowed and
seeped into the fill and this undoubtedly
increased the lateral stress on the walls and
floor of the canal. Collapsed of the walls and
heaving of the floor of the canal occurred soon
after as a result of increased soil and hydrostatic pressure.

The stability analysis given in this pape
by no means comprehensive.
Original g1
conditions were irreparably altered.
HowE
from field tests and observations, it apJ
that overstressing of the ground caused
sudden failure with rapid soil displacer
Tension cracks in the fill are signif:
indication of initial ground movement and
of impending failure.
In view of the
foundation soil at the site, some instrumE
tion such as inclinometers and piezomE
should have been installed before constru<
commenced at the site.
Readings from 1
devices would
have
forewarn any
imper
instability in the soil.

REMEDIAL MEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS
Remedial measures were required as soon as
possible
to prevent any further movement.
Survey measurements taken at the site regularly
after failure indicated that ground movements
towards
the
canal was
still
in
progress
although at a smaller magnitude.
It was feared
that these movements might increase during
period of
heavy rainfall or increase site
activities.
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measure, the slope was regraded gently to 1:8

Navfac DM-7 .1 (1982), "Design Manual on
Mechanics",
Department
of
Navy,
pp. 314-330.

1082
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu

